A Lyft rider’s negligent and fraudulent misrepresentation claims against Lyft over safety statements, after she said her driver assaulted her, are barred by Florida’s rideshare immunity statute, the Fourth District Court of Appeal held on November 4, 2026. In Haddad v. Lyft Florida, Inc., No. 4D2025-0117, the court read section 627.748(18), Florida Statutes, as an immunity that is “very broad” and not limited to traditional vicarious liability. Judge Lott wrote the opinion. Judges Klingensmith and Shaw concurred.
This is a substituted opinion. The court granted Louise Haddad’s motion for rehearing, denied her motions for rehearing en banc and for certification, and withdrew its earlier opinion, Haddad v. Lyft Florida, Inc., 51 Fla. L. Weekly D986 (Fla. 4th DCA May 13, 2026). It also accepted an amicus brief from the Florida Justice Association in support of her motion. The court affirmed.
The claims
Haddad alleged she took a Lyft ride on April 15, 2022, and that the driver assaulted her, causing severe and permanent injuries. She sued the driver for negligence and sued Lyft for negligent misrepresentation and fraudulent misrepresentation. Her theory was that Lyft’s website told riders about “High safety standards” and “Proactive safety measures” and said drivers must pass background checks, be re-screened annually, be continuously monitored for criminal convictions and complete a safety program, and that she relied on those statements in choosing to ride. The court said “[t]he merits of her claims are not before us.” The Broward County trial court dismissed the claims against Lyft with prejudice.
The rideshare immunity statute
Section 627.748(18)(a) provides that a transportation network company “is not liable under general law by reason of owning, operating, or maintaining the digital network accessed by a TNC driver or rider, or by being the TNC affiliated with a TNC driver, for harm to persons or property which results or arises out of the use, operation, or possession of a motor vehicle operating as a TNC vehicle while the driver is logged on to the digital network” if three conditions are met. There must be “no negligence under this section or criminal wrongdoing” by the company, the company must have fulfilled its obligations under the section with respect to the driver, and the company must not own the vehicle or be its bailee. The court noted that the structure parallels the federal Graves Amendment, 49 U.S.C. section 30106.
The three arguments
Haddad made two textual arguments and one procedural one. The court rejected all three.
Is the statute limited to vicarious liability? Subsection 18 is titled “Vicarious liability,” and Haddad argued it reaches only that. The court disagreed: “[w]here statutory text and title are inconsistent, we go with the text.” It read the phrases “under general law” and “by reason of” as reaching any claim in which Lyft’s network affiliation with the driver is a but-for element of the alleged liability. It said that language is “far broader than traditional vicarious liability.”
Does she allege “negligence under this section”? Haddad argued the phrase means negligence related to Lyft’s operation of its digital network. The court held it means negligence under section 627.748, “which plainly means a negligent failure to meet the statute’s requirements.” It noted the Graves Amendment says only “negligence,” so the added words “under this section” signal a departure. The court concluded that Haddad does not allege any “negligence under this section.”
Can the court apply it on a motion to dismiss? Haddad argued immunity is an affirmative defense that need not be negated in the complaint. The court held that Subsection 18 is “not a traditional affirmative defense, but a broader immunity cutting to the core of a cause of action against a TNC.” It pointed to the statute’s opening “no liability” structure, compared other Florida statutes that use the same language, and concluded that a plaintiff must plead facts that satisfy an exception to overcome the immunity. The trial court had given Haddad an opportunity to amend and she did not plead such facts.
What this does and does not mean
The court expressly left one question open. Haddad did not argue in her briefs that her injuries fell outside the statute’s “use, operation, or possession of a motor vehicle” language, so the court treated that argument as waived and assumed the injuries arose out of the use of the vehicle. It wrote that it was “not passing on” that question and left it “for another day.” The opinion also says that whether the legislators who voted on the text intended to confer immunity this broad “is immaterial,” and that “[w]hether it is wise to confer such broad immunity is not a question for this branch to answer.” The holding is about the text of the 2022 version of the statute as applied to these allegations.
The opinion is not final until disposition of any timely-filed motion for rehearing.
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Read the opinion (PDF): Download the opinion (PDF)
Source: Haddad v. Lyft Florida, Inc., No. 4D2025-0117 (Fla. 4th DCA Nov. 4, 2026) (on motion for rehearing, rehearing en banc, and certification). This article is general information, not legal advice.