House Bill 837’s changes to Florida’s collateral source rule apply only to cases filed after the law’s effective date, not to cases that were already pending, the Second District Court of Appeal held on November 13, 2026, in Unsworth v. Barsoumian, No. 2D2024-2962, a collateral source rule ruling that also found a trial court had limited an injured driver’s new trial too narrowly. Judge Guard wrote the opinion. Judge Labrit concurred. Judge Khouzam concurred specially.
The case
Christopher Unsworth and Brian Barsoumian were both driving on Interstate 275 in Tampa on April 18, 2020, when Barsoumian’s vehicle struck Unsworth’s vehicle twice. Unsworth sued Barsoumian for negligence on September 25, 2020. Barsoumian later admitted that his negligent operation of his vehicle caused the crash, leaving only the extent of Unsworth’s damages at issue.
How the trial court applied the new rule
Before trial, Barsoumian moved to admit evidence of Unsworth’s health insurance coverage under section 768.0427(2), Florida Statutes, a provision House Bill 837 created in 2023 that reversed the longstanding evidentiary ban on collateral source evidence. Unsworth argued the statute applied only to cases filed after its March 24, 2023, effective date, and his case had been filed in 2020. The trial court disagreed, ruling the statute applied anyway because it was procedural, and further ruled that Unsworth now bore the burden of proving how much his insurance would pay for his injuries. Unsworth testified about his insurance premiums and copayments, and his medical expert testified he had not factored insurance into his life care plan because future coverage would be speculative. Barsoumian then moved for a directed verdict on future medical expenses based on the gap in that proof, and the trial court granted it. The jury awarded Unsworth his past medical expenses but found he had no permanent injury and awarded no noneconomic damages.
A new trial, but how much of one
While Unsworth’s new trial motion was pending, the Fifth District decided Wolf v. Williams, holding that section 768.0427 applies only to causes of action filed after its effective date. The trial court granted Unsworth a new trial based on Wolf, though it said it disagreed with that decision. Barsoumian then persuaded the trial court to limit the new trial to past and future medical expenses only, and the court entered an amended order doing so. Both sides appealed.
The collateral source rule is not retroactive
The Second DCA agreed that section 768.0427 does not apply to cases filed before its effective date. The court did not decide whether the statute is “procedural” or “substantive,” reasoning that question is irrelevant once the legislature has specified when and how a law applies. House Bill 837 contains its own catchall provision, stating: “Except as otherwise expressly provided in this act, this act shall apply to causes of action filed after the effective date of this act.” Because nothing else in the bill says section 768.0427 applies differently, the court held it covers only cases filed after March 24, 2023. The ruling agreed with the Fifth District’s Wolf decision, which called that catchall provision an “insurmountable obstacle” to any other reading, and with similar readings from the Third and Fourth Districts.
Not harmless, and the new trial was too narrow
The court held that admitting the collateral source evidence and granting the directed verdict were not harmless errors, since it could not say there was “no reasonable possibility” the error affected the verdict. It also held the trial court abused its discretion by confining the new trial to medical expenses. The trial court itself had recognized that a jury’s view of past and future medical expenses could affect how it answered other questions on the verdict form, noting “the jury might be more receptive to the idea that his injury was permanent.” Because causation, permanency, and damages are “inextricably intertwined,” the Second DCA ordered that all three go to the new jury.
The concurrence
Judge Khouzam concurred specially, agreeing with the result but writing that the statutory analysis was more straightforward than the majority treated it: the legislature has the power to say when a law takes effect, and it did so here, so the trial court “clearly erred in applying” the statute to a case filed before its effective date.
What this does and does not mean
The ruling settles only when section 768.0427 applies in cases pending before the Second District; it does not reach House Bill 837’s other provisions, which carry their own, separately worded effective-date sections. The court expressly declined to decide whether the statute is procedural or substantive, since the legislature’s own language controlled the outcome. The opinion is “subject to revision prior to official publication.”
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Read the opinion (PDF): Download the opinion (PDF)
Source: Unsworth v. Barsoumian, No. 2D2024-2962 (Fla. 2d DCA Nov. 13, 2026). This article is general information, not legal advice.