A conviction for indirect criminal contempt cannot stand when the acts it rests on were alleged only in an unsworn motion, because the contempt proceeding then did not comply with Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.840(a). The Fourth District Court of Appeal so held on November 12, 2026, in Pugh v. State, No. 4D2025-2916, reversing a conviction for failing to comply with court-ordered timesharing. Judge Klingensmith wrote the opinion, and Chief Judge Gerber and Judge Shepherd concurred.
The background
A timesharing order was entered in October 2024, and a January 2025 omnibus order warned Ms. Pugh that noncompliance could result in contempt proceedings. In April 2025 she moved to suspend the former husband’s timesharing temporarily because of alleged safety concerns. The Department of Children and Families investigated and decided not to take further action, and she withdrew her motion.
The former husband then filed a motion for indirect criminal contempt. Two weeks later, the trial court issued an order to show cause. That order did not itself state the essential facts of the alleged contempt. It attached and incorporated highlighted allegations from two filings: the contempt motion and an emergency motion for a child pickup order.
Sworn versus unsworn
The contempt motion included what purported to be a notarized affidavit, and its highlighted allegations concerned withholding of timesharing and general assertions that she could comply but intended not to. The pickup motion alleged additional violations. The former husband signed an acknowledgment to that motion that he understood he was swearing or affirming to the truth of the claims, but the court described the motion as unsworn.
At trial, Ms. Pugh objected to consideration of any actions on dates beyond those supported by the sworn contempt motion. The State responded that both motions were incorporated into the order to show cause. The trial court considered the dates in both, found a willful violation, adjudicated her guilty of indirect criminal contempt and imposed a four-day jail sentence.
The indirect criminal contempt holding
The court reviews contempt orders for abuse of discretion, but a trial court must strictly comply with rule 3.840, and failure to do so is reversible error. Rule 3.840(a) allows an order to show cause on the court’s own motion or on the affidavit of a person with knowledge of the facts, and the order must state the essential facts. The court noted that an order incorporating and attaching a sworn petition may satisfy the rule, and that the absence of an affidavit or sworn testimony supporting the order is a fundamental defect.
The State conceded the pickup motion was unsworn but argued the sworn contempt motion supported the order. The court said that argument “overlooks the alleged acts upon which Appellant’s conviction rests.” She was found guilty for violations on April 11, 12, 13 and 23. Those occurred after the contempt motion was filed on April 9 and were alleged only in the unsworn April 23 pickup motion. The earlier affidavit could not supply sworn support for later events, and its general assertions of intent to disobey did not identify the specific later acts.
The signed acknowledgment did not cure the defect. An acknowledgment at the end of a pleading does not, by itself, constitute the affidavit rule 3.840 requires. Attaching an unsworn motion alongside a sworn motion that addresses different conduct did not satisfy the rule.
What this does and does not mean
The court reversed the conviction and sentence and remanded “without prejudice to the initiation of new indirect criminal contempt proceedings complying with rule 3.840 or the imposition of another lawful sanction short of criminal contempt.” It stated that its decision “rests only on the procedural defect of noncompliance with rule 3.840,” and that it took no position on the merits of the alleged violations on April 11, 12, 13 and 23. The opinion does not decide whether any violation occurred. It is not final until disposition of a timely filed motion for rehearing.
Related decisions: Is the State Entitled to the Recapture Period Under Rule 3.191 When Charges Come Late? Yes, the Florida Supreme Court Holds, Receding From Williams Is It a Seizure When Police Tell You to Stand By? A Third DCA Affirmance in a Juvenile Resisting Case Cites Cases That Say Yes
Read the opinion (PDF): Download the opinion (PDF)
Source: Pugh v. State, No. 4D2025-2916 (Fla. 4th DCA Nov. 12, 2026). This article is general information, not legal advice.