When a Florida defendant is convicted of both computer solicitation of a minor and travel after solicitation, the charging document has to make clear that the State relied on separate conduct for each offense, or the second punishment violates double jeopardy. The Sixth District Court of Appeal applied that rule on November 6, 2026, in Neu v. State, No. 6D2024-0677, and then certified a question asking the Florida Supreme Court to revisit it. Judge Gannam wrote the opinion. Judges Nardella and Mize concurred.
The court granted the State’s motion for certification, vacated its opinion of September 5, 2025, and substituted this one. A footnote says that apart from the new Part V certifying the question, the substituted opinion is the same as the earlier one.
The computer solicitation charges
A Polk County jury convicted Lawrence Alan Neu on all counts of an amended information: five counts of transmitting harmful material to a minor, one count of computer solicitation of a minor for sex (count 6), one count of attempted lewd battery on a child (count 7), and one count of travel for sex with a minor after computer solicitation (count 8). The trial court vacated the convictions on counts 1 through 5 and adjudicated him guilty on counts 6 through 8. It sentenced him to seven years in prison on count 8, followed by five years of sex offender probation on each of counts 6 and 7, to run concurrently. Counts 6 and 8 both allege conduct “between June 2, 2022 and June 3, 2022.”
The double jeopardy issue
Neu did not raise double jeopardy in the trial court. The court said “a violation of double jeopardy constitutes fundamental error that may be raised for the first time on appeal.” It applied the three-part analysis from its own decision in State v. Banda, 397 So. 3d 214 (Fla. 6th DCA 2024): whether the offenses occurred in one criminal transaction or episode, whether the “distinct acts” test shows separate acts, and whether the statutory “different elements” test shows the offenses are separate in law.
On the elements, the court relied on State v. Shelley, 176 So. 3d 914 (Fla. 2015). Shelley held that the elements of solicitation are entirely subsumed in the elements of travel after solicitation, so the two offenses are the same in law, and that separate convictions based on the same conduct violate double jeopardy. The Sixth District reasoned that the same is true of the child-solicitation provisions in section 847.0135(3)(a) and (4)(a). It followed that Neu’s two convictions could stand only if they rested on distinct acts of solicitation.
The charging-document rule
To decide that, the court applied Lee v. State (Fla. 2018), which held that a reviewing court “may consider only the charging document.” The information must “make clear” that the State “relied on separate conduct to charge the offenses.” Counts 6 and 8 had identical dates and consistent locations and nothing else to distinguish them. The court wrote that the dates and locations “could encompass separate solicitations,” but “the information does not make clear that the State relied on separate conduct to charge the offenses.” By contrast, counts 1 through 5 each stated the conduct charged was “separate and distinct from” the others. The court did not say that exact language is required, and noted the State can differentiate conduct by “time, place, or circumstances.”
The court reversed the conviction on the lesser offense, solicitation (count 6), reversed the sentence, and remanded for an amended judgment and resentencing on counts 7 and 8.
The certified question
The State told the court it is bound by Lee but argued Lee was wrongly decided. The court agreed that “the Florida Supreme Court should revisit Lee” and certified this question as one of great public importance:
“In reviewing a defendant’s double jeopardy claim that multiple convictions are based upon the same conduct, is the reviewing court limited to consideration of the charging document, or may the court consider the entire record to decide whether multiple acts supported the convictions?”
What this does and does not mean
The reversal applies Lee as it stands today. The opinion also leaves some points open. It does not decide whether the “foreclose any possibility” standard from the Second District’s Morejon-Medina decision is more demanding than Lee‘s “make clear” standard. The opinion cites Lee as 258 So. 3d 1297 in some places and 285 So. 3d 1297 in others.
The opinion is not final until the time to file a motion for rehearing expires and any timely motion is decided.
Related decisions: Does the Speedy Trial Clock Start at the First Arrest for Other Drugs Found in the Same Traffic Stop? The Second DCA Says Not If It Is a Separate Criminal Episode Can Police Frisk a Man Detained for a Bicycle Light Violation Who Appears to Be Carrying a Gun? The Fourth DCA Says Yes on These Facts, Over a Dissent
Read the opinion (PDF): Download the opinion (PDF)
Also on tagerlaw.com: Can You Be Convicted of Both Computer Solicitation and Travel After Solicitation in Florida? Not If the Charges Rest on the Same Conduct
Source: Neu v. State, No. 6D2024-0677 (Fla. 6th DCA Nov. 6, 2026) (on motion for certification). This article is general information, not legal advice.