The State is entitled to the recapture period under rule 3.191 of the Florida Rules of Criminal Procedure even when charges are not filed until after the speedy trial period has run. The Florida Supreme Court so held in State v. Robinson, No. SC2024-0314, decided November 12, 2026, in an opinion by Justice Francis. The Court receded from State v. Williams, 791 So. 2d 1088 (Fla. 2001), and quashed a Fifth District decision that had vacated the defendant’s convictions.
The recapture period under rule 3.191: the question and the answer. The Court framed the question as whether the State is entitled to the recapture period when charges are filed after the speedy trial period has run. For more than two decades, under Williams, the answer had been no: a defendant was entitled to automatic discharge based solely on the State’s failure to file charges within that period. The Court answered the question in the affirmative, because the text of rule 3.191 never permitted discharge without giving the State the recapture period.
How the case got here
A Jacksonville Sheriff’s Office warrant for Robinson’s arrest on attempted murder and possession of a firearm by a convicted felon issued in April 2015. On November 2, 2015, FDLE agents and Suwannee County deputies carried out a takedown at a music festival, and Robinson was booked there only on local charges based on contraband found at the scene. He served a 20.4-month sentence on those charges. Two days before it ended, on April 28, 2017, he was taken to Jacksonville and arrested on the Duval County warrant. He was formally charged and booked the next day.
Robinson moved for discharge, arguing that the November 2, 2015 takedown was an arrest that started the speedy trial clock and that charges came after 175 days. The trial court denied the motion. He then entered a “best interest” plea and was sentenced to twenty years for attempted murder and a concurrent fifteen years on the firearm count. The Fifth District reversed the denial of discharge, with each judge writing separately, but all three questioned whether Williams was correct and joined in certifying a question of great public importance.
The notice of expiration was never filed
Under the pre-2025 rule, the Court explained, discharge became available only after the defendant filed a notice of expiration. That filing triggered a mandatory hearing and, absent an exception in subdivision (j), an order that the defendant be brought to trial within ten days. Discharge was authorized only if the defendant was not brought to trial in that recapture period. Robinson never filed a notice of expiration, so he did not comply with the procedural requirements that would have entitled him to discharge.
Why the Court receded from Williams
The Court held that Williams is clearly erroneous because it did not follow the rule’s text and created the equivalent of a substantive right without any basis in statute or the state or federal constitutions. On reliance, it said reliance interests are lowest for procedural rules, that Williams regulates the State’s conduct rather than defendants’, and that Robinson did not argue otherwise. It found no significant reliance interest favoring keeping Williams.
The 2025 amendment to rule 3.191
In 2025 the Court amended rule 3.191, prospectively, to clarify that “the recapture period is mandatory in all situations.” The Court said those amendments effectively rejected the Williams interpretation and corrected much of its error, and that this decision completes the correction for the pre-2025 version of the rule.
Disposition
The Court quashed the Fifth District’s decision and remanded with instructions to reinstate Robinson’s convictions and sentences for attempted murder and possession of a firearm by a convicted felon.
The vote
Chief Justice Couriel and Justices Muñiz, Grosshans, Barrios and Tanenbaum concurred, so six justices joined the opinion.
Justice Labarga concurred in the result only
He agreed that Robinson was not entitled to automatic discharge, because even under the pre-2025 rule his recourse was to file a notice of expiration, which would, barring certain findings at a mandatory hearing, trigger the recapture period. He said he continues to adhere to his dissent from the 2025 amendments, in which he objected to lengthening the recapture period from 10 to 30 days and to making any discharge without prejudice unless the defendant’s constitutional speedy trial right has been violated.
What this does and does not mean
The holding is that the State gets the recapture period after a notice of expiration, even where charges came late, and that automatic discharge is not available in that situation. The Court did not decide whether an arrest occurred on November 2, 2015. It wrote that it was “assuming” the Fifth District majority was correct that the 175-day period had expired, and it did not resolve the Fifth District judges’ disagreement over the Melton factors. The Court also did not decide whether Robinson’s constitutional right to a speedy trial was violated; the Court decided the case under rule 3.191. The opinion is marked not final until time expires to file a rehearing motion and, if one is filed, it is determined.
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Read the opinion (PDF): Download the opinion (PDF)
Source: State v. Robinson, No. SC2024-0314 (Fla. Nov. 12, 2026). This article is general information, not legal advice.