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Can a Florida Parent Vacate a Termination of Parental Rights Consent Default After Missing the Hearing? Not on This Record, Third DCA Holds

A Florida termination of parental rights consent default, entered when a parent does not appear at the adjudicatory hearing, was left in place here when the court affirmed the denial of the parent’s motion to vacate it. The Third District Court of Appeal so held on October 28, 2026, in L.C. v. Department of Children and Families, No. 3D26-1246, in a per curiam opinion. Chief Judge Scales and Judges Logue and Bokor sat on the panel. This article does not name the child.

What happened

The mother did not appear at an April 17, 2026 adjudicatory hearing on the Department of Children and Families’ petition to terminate her parental rights. The opinion says that resulted in a “consent default.” The trial court entered a final judgment terminating her parental rights on April 22, 2026, and denied her motion to vacate the default.

The termination of parental rights consent default

The court affirmed both the denial of the motion to vacate and the final judgment. Its explanation is in footnotes. They quote section 39.801(3)(e), Florida Statutes (2026), on the effect of a parent’s failure to appear at the adjudicatory hearing, and they cite Florida Department of Children and Family Services v. P.E., 14 So. 3d 228 (Fla. 2009), which treats the entry of the consent as essentially a default. They also set out the three-part test from P.E. for vacating a default: due diligence, excusable neglect, and a meritorious defense to the termination petition. The text of the opinion does not say which part of that test the mother failed, and it does not describe her reasons for missing the hearing.

That consent-default rule has a built-in notice prerequisite: footnote 1’s quotation of section 39.801(3)(e) applies specifically “if a parent appears for the advisory hearing and the court orders that parent to appear at the adjudicatory hearing for the petition for termination of parental rights, stating the date, time, and location of the hearing” — it is the parent’s failure to appear at that later hearing, after being told exactly when and where to be, that counts as consent. The opinion does not say whether that notice was given here beyond citing the statute, but the rule itself does not reach every missed hearing. Footnote 3 also cites authority distinguishing two separate things a court must find in a termination case: that the statutory grounds for termination are established (which a consent default can resolve by default) and that termination serves the child’s manifest best interest, which is a separate determination the law still requires regardless of whether a parent participates. The opinion does not suggest that finding was skipped here, only that the two questions are not the same one.

Scrivener’s errors

The court remanded so the trial court could correct what it called “inadvertent scrivener’s errors” in the Introduction section of the final judgment. The Introduction said the Department was not seeking to terminate the mother’s rights, and said the court had heard and weighed evidence on each ground in the petition. The mother was correct that those statements were inaccurate: the petition did seek termination, and because of the consent default the trial court heard no evidence on the grounds alleged. The court held these mistakes were not reversible error because they “had no substantive effect on the trial court’s analysis and decision.”

What this does and does not mean

The disposition is “Affirmed and remanded with instructions,” and the remand is limited to correcting the judgment’s wording. The opinion is short and does not analyze the facts of the mother’s absence, so it should not be read as stating what excuses a missed hearing in other cases. It applies existing law to this record.

The opinion is not final until disposition of any timely filed motion for rehearing.

Related decisions: Does Florida Require Findings for Durational Alimony on Need and Ability to Pay? Yes, the First DCA Held, and Reversed an Award Without Them Does Reassignment to a Different Division Moot a Florida Motion to Disqualify the Judge? Yes, the Third DCA Says, Dismissing a Prohibition Petition

Read the opinion (PDF): Download the opinion (PDF)

Source: L.C. v. Department of Children and Families, No. 3D26-1246 (Fla. 3d DCA Oct. 28, 2026). This article is general information, not legal advice.