A trial court cannot strike a final judgment provision on its own initiative after the time for rehearing has expired merely because it later decides the provision was legally wrong. The Fourth District Court of Appeal held that on October 28, 2026, in Taplin Falls, Ltd. v. Brown, No. 4D2025-3894, reversing a Broward County Court order that struck a fee-filing period from a final judgment and then denied the landlord’s fee motion as untimely. Judge Klingensmith wrote the opinion. Chief Judge Gerber and Associate Judge Rebecca White concurred.
The facts
The case was an uncontested landlord-tenant action. In August 2025 the trial court entered a final judgment awarding Taplin Falls $10,233 and reserving jurisdiction to award attorney’s fees and costs. Paragraph 4 of the judgment gave Taplin Falls “forty-five (45) days from the date of this Final Judgment to pursue attorney’s fees and costs.” Taplin Falls filed its fee motion on the forty-fifth day.
About three months after the judgment, at a November 2025 hearing on that motion, the trial court on its own struck paragraph 4. It then denied the motion as untimely, citing Florida Rule of Civil Procedure 1.525 and Barco v. School Board of Pinellas County. Taplin Falls sought rehearing or reconsideration. The trial court denied relief, calling the timing issue “very well established black letter law.”
Why a trial court cannot strike a final judgment provision this way. The Fourth District said the question was not whether the 45-day period was correctly chosen when the judgment was entered. The question was whether the trial court could later strike that substantive provision through the procedure it used. It reviewed that question de novo.
The court explained that a final judgment ends the trial court’s jurisdiction except to enforce the judgment, and that its authority to revise a judgment is governed by Rules 1.530 and 1.540. The reservation of jurisdiction over fees allowed the court to resolve that remaining matter only. It “did not confer continuing authority to rewrite substantive terms of the final judgment.”
The window to seek rehearing or a new trial under Rule 1.530 had long expired by the November 2025 hearing — about three months after the August 2025 judgment — under either the 10-day period the opinion’s own language reflects or the current 15-day period set by a rule amendment that predates this judgment. Readers should rely on the current 15-day figure, not the opinion’s wording, for any live deadline. Rule 1.540(a), which allows correction of clerical mistakes, did not apply because the order identified no clerical mistake and the change “was not ministerial.” Rule 1.540(b)(1) did not apply because it does not permit correction of judicial error arising from a mistaken view of the law, citing Curbelo v. Ullman. Because the deletion was unauthorized, the court held the later denial of the fee motion could not stand on the premise that the provision could be retroactively removed.
The disposition
The court reversed both orders. On remand the trial court must reinstate paragraph 4 and determine entitlement to fees and costs on Taplin Falls’s motion and, if entitlement is established, the amount. The court wrote: “We express no view on either entitlement or amount.”
What this does and does not mean
The court did not decide whether a 45-day fee-motion period was legally correct, and it did not decide whether Taplin Falls is entitled to any fees. The opinion mentions rule 1.525 and Barco only as the trial court’s stated basis and does not analyze them. The decision rests on the trial court’s lack of authority to revise the judgment as it did on this record. No appearance was entered for the appellees. The caption lists Taplin Meadows Development Corporation as a second appellant, but the opinion describes and resolves the appeal as that of Taplin Falls. The opinion is not final until a timely motion for rehearing is disposed of.
Related decisions: Must a County Use Its Own Code Enforcement Process Before Suing in Court? No, the Third DCA Held, Reversing a Dismissal of Monroe County's Fire Code Counterclaims A Tenant's Failure to Deposit Rent Into the Court Registry Decides Possession Only, Not Damages, First DCA Rules
Read the opinion (PDF): Download the opinion (PDF)
Source: Taplin Falls, Ltd. v. Brown, No. 4D2025-3894 (Fla. 4th DCA Oct. 28, 2026). This article is general information, not legal advice.