Crandall Medical Consulting, LLC v. Gainey · No. 1D2025-2124 (Fla. 1st DCA) · Decided October 7, 2026
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A support-coordination company assigned by the Agency for Persons with Disabilities to a young man with complex medical needs, and its employee, were agents of the State entitled to immunity under section 768.28(9)(a), Florida Statutes, even though a services agreement described the employee as an independent service provider, the First District Court of Appeal has held. The court reversed an Alachua County order denying their summary judgment motion and directed entry of summary judgment in their favor.
What Happened
According to the opinion, Nazariah Brown was a young adult man with complex medical needs who lived with his mother and other family members until August 18, 2022, when the family lost the lease on their home. The Department of Children and Families became involved in May 2022, when the family’s housing became precarious, and to keep Mr. Brown from becoming homeless, with his mother’s written consent, Department personnel placed him in a group home on an emergency basis. In August 2022, the Agency for Persons with Disabilities (APD) assumed responsibility for his services under chapter 393, Florida Statutes.
John L. Gainey, Mr. Brown’s uncle, filed a twelve-count amended complaint for damages allegedly suffered by Mr. Brown. Mr. Brown died while the lawsuit was pending. Gainey, who was previously Mr. Brown’s guardian, is now the personal representative of his estate. Crandall Medical Consulting, LLC, and its employee Braandon Davis are two of the defendants. The complaint alleged that Crandall Medical was responsible for assessing Mr. Brown’s needs, preparing a waiver support coordination plan, and monitoring his service providers, and that Davis was the employee responsible for preparing his waiver support plan and taking actions necessary to protect his safety and well-being. It alleged they failed those duties, including by failing to provide a plan, monitor his condition, see that his needs were met, and transfer him to a facility able to meet them. Crandall Medical and Davis admitted the allegations about their responsibilities. The counts against them alleged violations of Mr. Brown’s rights under section 393.13, Florida Statutes (“The Bill of Rights of Persons with Developmental Disabilities”), vicarious liability for employees’ negligence, and negligent hiring, training, and supervision. The court noted that the amended complaint contained no allegations that Crandall Medical or Davis acted in bad faith, with malicious purpose, or with wanton and willful disregard of human rights, safety, or property — the exceptions to immunity under section 768.28(9)(a).
Crandall Medical and Davis moved for summary judgment, asserting that they were agents of the State acting under APD’s control or direction. They filed depositions of Daniel Crandall, the company’s owner and founder, and of Davis, establishing that APD assigned them to Mr. Brown’s case in late October or early November 2022. Davis testified that he did not act independently of APD’s assignment and had no discretion to reject it, provided case coordination only to people APD referred, used APD forms and templates, completed APD certification and training, and reported his activities through a platform APD monitored.
Gainey did not contest those facts. Instead, he relied on a November 2018 Medicaid Waiver Services Agreement signed by Davis and an APD representative, which provided that Davis acted “as an independent service provider” and “not as an officer, employee, or agent of APD.” The trial court denied summary judgment, saying at the hearing that “there are just way too many facts in dispute here to grant” the motion.
What the Court Held
The First District held that the trial court applied an incorrect legal standard. Whether a contracting party is an agent of the State turns on the degree of control the agency retains or exercises, the court explained, citing the Florida Supreme Court’s decision in Stoll v. Noel, 694 So. 2d 701 (Fla. 1997), and the focus is on the right to control. Quoting Lovelace v. G4S Secure Solutions (USA), Inc., 320 So. 3d 178 (Fla. 4th DCA 2021), the court wrote that agency status “may be decided as a question of law in those cases where the party opposing summary judgment is unable to point to any conflicting facts or inferences to be drawn from the facts.”
The contract clause did not change the result. Under Lovelace and the Second District case it quoted, an express statement of intent about agency status is to be considered but is not dispositive, and Stoll recognized that independent contractors “are not precluded from being agents of the state.” The First District held that the trial court’s finding of disputed issues about APD’s control “was unsupported by any admissible evidence submitted by Gainey,” and that the control facts shown in the depositions were undisputed for purposes of the motion. Given those undisputed facts, the court concluded, “Appellants were entitled to summary judgment as a matter of law on their sovereign immunity defense.”
In a footnote, the court addressed cases that apply section 768.28(2) and (5) to give a corporation only limited sovereign immunity rather than the immunity in section 768.28(9). Those cases do not apply to Crandall Medical, the court said, because it is a limited liability company, and an LLC “is not a corporation under Florida law.”
The court reversed with instructions to enter summary judgment for Crandall Medical and Davis. Judge Bilbrey wrote the opinion, joined by Judges M.K. Thomas and Long. A footnote notes that a separate appeal, No. 1D2025-2106, involves similar issues and allegations, with the Department of Children and Families claiming sovereign immunity applies to it too.
Why It Matters
The decision holds that, where the record shows the State agency’s control over a contractor’s assignment and services and the opposing party offers nothing to dispute it, a contract label calling the contractor independent does not defeat agency status for purposes of section 768.28(9)(a), and the question can be resolved on summary judgment. The opinion also stresses timing: quoting a Sixth District decision that in turn quoted the Florida Supreme Court, it noted that “entitlement to sovereign immunity should be established as early in the litigation as possible.” Separately, its footnote distinguishes limited liability companies from corporations for purposes of the limited immunity in section 768.28(5).
The Opinion
Download the full opinion (PDF)
| Court | First District Court of Appeal |
| Case No. | 1D2025-2124 |
| Lower Court | Circuit Court, Alachua County (Judge Gloria R. Walker) |
| Opinion by | Judge Bilbrey (Judges M.K. Thomas and Long concurring) |
| Decided | October 7, 2026 |
| Result | Reversed with instructions to enter summary judgment for Appellants |