Paul v. Michel · No. 4D2025-3854 (Fla. 4th DCA) · Decided October 7, 2026
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A mother who did not give her child the desired name at birth, or change it administratively before the child’s first birthday, is not precluded from seeking a name change under section 68.07, Florida Statutes, the Fourth District Court of Appeal has held. Finding that the trial court abused its discretion on that ground, on the ground that an earlier petition had been denied, and in finding the change not in the child’s best interest, the court reversed and remanded for entry of an order granting the petition.
What Happened
Suzette Paul petitioned in Palm Beach County circuit court to change her minor child’s name. The child’s father filed an unverified answer opposing the change but did not appear at the final hearing.
At the hearing, the child’s licensed mental health counselor testified that the name change was in the child’s best interest. The mother testified at length: she and the father had never married, the child had very limited contact with the father, and she had been the sole custodial and caregiving parent for almost all of the child’s life. She also described the child’s preferences at school and addressed the factors listed in section 68.07.
The trial court denied the petition. It reasoned that because the mother was not married to the father at the time of the child’s birth, the mother could have selected the child’s given name and surname under section 382.013(3)(c), Florida Statutes, or changed the name within the child’s first year through the administrative procedure in section 382.016(1)(a). Because she did neither, the court indicated, she was precluded from using section 68.07. The trial court also relied on the denial of the mother’s previous name-change petition, from which no appellate review was sought. The mother appealed; the father made no appearance in the appeal.
What the Court Held
Reviewing for abuse of discretion, the Fourth District reversed on each ground.
The birth-registration statutes. Section 68.07, the court said, “exists to allow for the request of a name change independent of those statutes, when the petitioner meets the qualifications of the statute and the name change is in the best interest of the child.” Sections 382.013(3)(c) and 382.016(1)(a) “are not a barrier to the mother’s petition to change the child’s first and last name pursuant to section 68.07,” and denying the petition on that basis was an abuse of discretion.
The earlier denial. Quoting the First District, the court noted that “there is no statutory restriction on the number of times a person may file a name change petition.” It added that res judicata does not apply “where there are changed conditions and new facts which did not exist at the time of the prior judgment,” and does not apply where the claims in two cases concern different periods of time. The mother testified to the child’s current circumstances years after the earlier denial, which the court described as a denial “for lack of evidence.” Relying on the prior denial was an abuse of discretion.
Best interest. The court held that the hearing testimony “constituted substantial competent evidence that met section 68.07’s prerequisites for a name change.” The father offered no sworn affidavit or other evidence. The only evidence was that everyone knew the child by the desired name, the uncontroverted testimony showed the child wanted to share her mother’s last name, and the counselor opined that from a mental health standpoint the change was in the child’s best interest. The trial court’s contrary best-interest ruling was an abuse of discretion.
The court also restated the petition requirements under section 68.07: the petition must aver that neither the child’s nor the petitioning parent’s history includes any disqualifying factor, including any ulterior or illegal purpose, and the verified petition and evidence must show how the change would serve the child’s best interests.
Why It Matters
The decision confirms that the birth-registration provisions of Chapter 382 operate independently of the judicial name-change procedure in section 68.07, so a parent who did not use them is not foreclosed from petitioning later. It also holds that a prior denial does not bar a new petition based on the child’s current circumstances, and, on this record — where the father filed only an unverified answer, did not appear at the final hearing, and offered no evidence — it found the trial court’s best-interest ruling to be an abuse of discretion.
The Opinion
Download the full opinion (PDF)
| Court | Fourth District Court of Appeal |
| Case No. | 4D2025-3854 |
| Lower Court | Circuit Court, Fifteenth Judicial Circuit, Palm Beach County (Judge Karen M. Miller) |
| Opinion by | Judge Gross (Judges May and Ciklin concurring) |
| Decided | October 7, 2026 |
| Result | Reversed and remanded for entry of an order granting the petition |