City of Maitland v. McGovern · No. 1D2025-2729 (Fla. 1st DCA) · Decided October 7, 2026
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The City of Maitland remains responsible for a former firefighter’s heart-disease claim and cannot obtain contribution from the airport authority where he later worked, the First District Court of Appeal has held. Because the firefighter’s preemployment physical at the second employer showed heart disease, the statutory presumption of occupational causation did not apply there, and Maitland offered no evidence connecting his condition to that later job.
What Happened
William McGovern began working as a firefighter for Maitland in 1988 and, as found by the judge of compensation claims (JCC), passed a preemployment physical with no evidence of heart disease. In June 2012, he had a cardiac stenting procedure after a catheterization revealed a seventy to eighty percent occlusion of his left anterior descending artery. He used accrued sick leave and Family Medical Leave Act time and retired from Maitland in August 2012 without reporting the condition as a workers’ compensation injury; Maitland did not report the incident to its servicing agent.
Shortly after retiring, he began working as a firefighter for the Sanford Airport Authority. His preemployment physical there showed evidence of heart disease. After about twelve years, he experienced further heart complications in 2024, underwent additional stent procedures and a double bypass, and was placed on a heart transplant list.
He filed a petition for benefits against Maitland and its servicing agent, Davies Claims North America, Inc., alleging a June 25, 2012 date of accident. Maitland filed a notice of controversy under section 440.42(4), Florida Statutes, contending that the Sanford Airport Authority and its servicing agent were responsible under the last injurious exposure rule. The JCC found the heart condition compensable as to Maitland, awarded medical care and impairment benefits, denied temporary disability benefits, and denied Maitland’s contribution claim. The JCC reasoned that there can be no injurious exposure in heart disease cases where the section 112.18(1) presumption does not apply, absent a concession or finding that the disease is compensable without it.
What the Court Held
Section 440.151(5), Florida Statutes (2011), provides that for an occupational disease, the employer “in whose employment the employee was last injuriously exposed to the hazards of such disease” and its carrier “shall alone be liable therefor, without right to contribution from any prior employer or insurance carrier.” The parties agreed heart disease may constitute an occupational disease. Maitland argued that under the statute’s plain language the airport authority was responsible because McGovern was last injuriously exposed to the hazards of firefighting there.
“Like the JCC did, we reject this contention,” the per curiam opinion states. As Maitland acknowledged, because the preemployment physical with the airport authority showed heart disease, the section 112.18 presumption did not apply to that employment. The court also noted that Maitland “presented no evidence demonstrating any connection” between the condition and the later employment, and that the airport authority and its servicing agent did not concede compensability arising from that employment. “Under these circumstances,” the court held, Maitland and its servicing agent “failed to support” the claim that McGovern was last “injuriously exposed” while working for the airport authority, so the JCC did not err in denying contribution.
The appellants raised several other arguments; the court said only this one merited discussion and affirmed as to all issues raised.
In a footnote to its citation of City of Mary Esther v. McArtor, 902 So. 2d 942 (Fla. 1st DCA 2005), the court noted that it explained in Friesen v. State of Florida Highway Patrol/Division of Risk Management, 364 So. 3d 1051 (Fla. 1st DCA 2023), that McArtor was implicitly overturned in City of Port Orange v. Sedacca, 953 So. 2d 727 (Fla. 1st DCA 2007), due to its reliance on the definition of “disability” in section 440.02(13), Florida Statutes.
Why It Matters
For firefighter heart-disease claims under section 112.18(1), the decision indicates that an employer seeking to shift liability to a later employer under section 440.151(5) must support the claim of a last injurious exposure there. Where the presumption did not apply at the later job because the firefighter’s preemployment physical already showed heart disease, the earlier employer here could not rely on the later firefighting employment alone, absent evidence connecting the condition to it or a concession of compensability.
The Opinion
Download the full opinion (PDF)
| Court | First District Court of Appeal |
| Case No. | 1D2025-2729 |
| Lower Court | Office of the Judges of Compensation Claims (Judge Wilbur W. Anderson) |
| Opinion by | Per curiam (Lewis, M.K. Thomas, and Treadwell, JJ.) |
| Decided | October 7, 2026 |
| Result | Affirmed |