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Does an Officer’s Testimony Alone Prove a Lawful Inventory Search Policy? Yes, Even Without a Written Document, the Sixth DCA Held

Officer testimony that police tow and search impounded vehicles for safety reasons can be enough to prove a lawful inventory search policy under the Fourth Amendment, and that officers followed it, even when the State never produces a written copy of the policy — as it was on this record. The Sixth District Court of Appeal so held on November 13, 2026, in Broughton v. State, No. 6D2024-1193, affirming the denial of a motion to suppress. Judge Smith wrote the opinion. Chief Judge Traver and Judge Wozniak concurred.

The case

Fort Myers police arrested George S. Broughton, IV, for reckless driving and, because no other registered owner was present to take the vehicle, had it towed. Before the tow, officers searched the vehicle and found cocaine, a gun holster, and two handgun magazines. Broughton, a convicted felon, pleaded no contest to reckless driving, possession of cocaine, and possession of ammunition by a convicted felon, reserving the right to appeal the denial of his motion to suppress.

What the officers said at the suppression hearing

One officer testified that impoundment occurs “because the registered owner of the vehicle was placed under arrest” and that there is “no exception” to the rule against releasing a vehicle “to anybody other than the registered owner.” He testified that police then conduct “an inventory search of the vehicle” “for the safety of the belongings of the items and property inside of the vehicle.” A second officer confirmed it is “policy for the Fort Myers Police Department for towing a car when a person is under arrest” and that it is “also policy not to release the vehicle to any third parties.” No written policy document was introduced. Broughton’s counsel argued that without one, the officers’ statements were merely “conclusory.”

The inventory search policy requirement

The inventory search exception to the warrant requirement has “no connection with any criminal investigation” and instead serves a “caretaking function,” protecting an owner’s property, protecting police against claims of lost or stolen property, and protecting police from danger. To qualify, a search “must be performed in accordance with the governmental entity’s standardized operating procedure,” and the State bears the burden of putting on evidence of that standard. The court held that United States Supreme Court inventory-search cases, including South Dakota v. Opperman, do not require any particular quality or quantity of evidence to establish the policy’s existence — in Opperman itself, the only proof was that an officer used “a standard inventory form pursuant to standard police procedures.”

The court traced the same pattern through Illinois v. Lafayette, where it was enough that it was “standard procedure to search ‘everything’ on a person arrested,” and through Florida’s own State v. Smith, where officers never quoted or cited any section of a written policy and the court still found the testimony sufficient. It distinguished Beezley v. State and Leary v. State, where the State had presented no evidence at all of a policy’s existence, calling Broughton’s reliance on those cases “misplaced.”

Aligning with federal circuits

The court also looked to multiple federal circuits that have held “not only that officer testimony alone is sufficient to establish a policy but … that the law enforcement policy need not be in writing,” citing decisions from the Second, Fifth, Sixth, Eighth, and Ninth Circuits. Applying that approach, the panel held the two officers’ testimony “sufficient to … establish both the existence of an inventory search policy and that the policy was followed” even though the State never introduced a written copy of the Fort Myers Police Department’s procedure.

What this does and does not mean

The court was careful to call the officers’ testimony “basic,” so the ruling does not set a high floor — it holds that minimal, non-conclusory testimony about a towing-and-inventory practice can be enough. The opinion does not address whether testimony alone would suffice for a closed-container search, an issue the court noted is governed by a separate line of cases including Florida v. Wells and Colorado v. Bertine, and which was not before it here. The court separately rejected, without extended discussion, Broughton’s argument that police lacked probable cause for the reckless driving arrest. The opinion is not final until any timely motion for rehearing is resolved.

Related decisions: Does Florida Recognize a Freestanding Actual Innocence Claim in Postconviction Capital Cases? No, the Supreme Court Holds, Denying Overton's Stay Can the State Appeal a Juvenile Disposition That Departs From the Plea Agreement? The First DCA Says Not Unless It Is Illegal

Read the opinion (PDF): Download the opinion (PDF)

Also on tagerlaw.com: Do Police Need a Written Policy for a Vehicle Inventory Search? No, Testimony Alone Can Be Enough, Says Florida's Sixth DCA

Source: Broughton v. State, No. 6D2024-1193 (Fla. 6th DCA Nov. 13, 2026). This article is general information, not legal advice.