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Does Florida’s property-insurance presuit notice law apply to older policies? No, the Florida Supreme Court says

Universal Property & Casualty Insurance Co. v. Hughes · No. SC2024-0025 (Fla.) · Decided October 22, 2026

A homeowner who sues her property insurer over a policy issued before July 1, 2021 does not have to file the Department of Financial Services notice that section 627.70152 requires. The Florida Supreme Court decided that on October 22, 2026, in Universal Property & Casualty Insurance Co. v. Hughes, No. SC2024-0025.

The statute

Section 627.70152, Florida Statutes, took effect July 1, 2021. Before filing a suit under a property insurance policy, the claimant must give the Department of Financial Services written notice of intent to sue, at least 10 business days ahead and not before the insurer has made a coverage determination. A suit filed without the notice must be dismissed without prejudice. The original statute also barred attorney’s fees for work done before a dismissal on that ground. The fee bar was in subsection (8)(b); subsection (8) was repealed in 2022.

The facts

Rebecca Hughes had a Universal homeowners policy from April 24, 2019 to April 24, 2020. She made a water-damage claim on May 29, 2019. Universal paid, she said the payment was too low, and she sued on August 4, 2021 without filing the notice. The trial court dismissed her complaint without prejudice. Hughes appealed.

The split

The district courts disagreed:

  • The Fourth District (Cole v. Universal, 363 So. 3d 1089 (Fla. 4th DCA 2023)) and the Third District (Cantens v. Certain Underwriters at Lloyd’s London, 388 So. 3d 242 (Fla. 3d DCA 2024)) held the notice requirement applies to policies that were already in force.
  • The Sixth District (in Hughes, 374 So. 3d 900 (Fla. 6th DCA 2023), which reversed the dismissal) and, per the Supreme Court’s opinion, the First, Second and Fifth Districts held it does not.

The holding

The Court approved the Sixth District’s decision “to the extent it is consistent with this decision” and disapproved Cole. It applied the two-step test from Menendez v. Progressive Express Insurance Co., 35 So. 3d 873 (Fla. 2010): first, did the Legislature clearly intend retroactive application; second, if so, would that violate the constitution. The Court did not reach the second step.

  • Subsection (1) says the section “applies exclusively to all suits not brought by an assignee arising under a residential or commercial property insurance policy.” The Court read that as describing which cases and policies the statute covers, not as a command to reach back.
  • Subsection (3) makes notice “a condition precedent to filing a suit.” The Fourth District had reasoned that if the Legislature meant to limit this to new policies, it would have said so. The Court said that turns its precedent “on its head”: the absence of a statement is not clear evidence of retroactive intent, and, quoting the Sixth District, “clear evidence must consist of more than silence.”
  • The statute also has an effective date, which the Court has long treated as evidence against retroactivity.

Procedural versus substantive

Universal argued the notice requirement is procedural, so the retroactivity test should not apply. The Court conceded that “[i]f the presuit notice requirement stood by itself, Universal might have a point,” but said that in deciding whether a statute is substantive it looks at the statute “as a whole.” It dismisses suits that lack notice, (under the old subsection (8)(b)) cut off pre-dismissal fees, gives insurers a safe harbor and extra time to pay, and delays the insured’s right to sue. The Court agreed with the Sixth District that it “significantly alters an insurer’s obligation to pay and an insured’s right to sue.”

The concurrence

Justice Tanenbaum concurred separately. He would not have needed Menendez at all, because section 624.21 (a point the majority does not mention) says each amendment to the insurance code “shall be construed to operate prospectively, unless a contrary legislative intent is specified.” The Legislature regulates the industry heavily, he wrote, and policies are written against the law in effect when they are issued.

Who joined

Chief Justice Couriel wrote the opinion. Justices Labarga, Muñiz, Grosshans, Francis and Barrios concurred, and Justice Tanenbaum concurred in a separate opinion.

What it does not decide

The opinion concerns a policy issued in 2019. It does not address policies issued after July 1, 2021, and nothing in it says the notice requirement is invalid for those; Justice Tanenbaum’s concurrence says it applies to them. The majority also did not reach the constitutional second step of Menendez.

The opinion is not final until the time to file a rehearing motion expires and any motion is decided.

Read the opinion (PDF): Download the opinion (PDF)

Source: Universal Property & Casualty Insurance Co. v. Hughes, No. SC2024-0025 (Fla. Oct. 22, 2026). This article is general information, not legal advice.