A Florida trial court cannot make a parent’s court-ordered time with three children depend on whether the oldest child is willing to take part. The Third District Court of Appeal said so on October 21, 2026, in Conway v. Wallin, No. 3D26-0386, reversing a temporary timesharing order from Miami-Dade County.
What the trial court did
The order conditioned Stanley Conway’s temporary timesharing with the parties’ three children “only to the extent that the eldest child is willing to participate.” The order also required all three children to attend together.
The holding
The Third District said the statute the court identified as the basis for its authority over temporary timesharing, section 61.13(2)(c), Florida Statutes, requires the court to “determine all matters relating to parenting and time-sharing of each minor child of the parties in accordance with the best interests of the child.” The panel wrote that Florida courts “have consistently held that this statute entrusts all time-sharing determinations to the court alone, and it is error to commit that decision to any other individual, including the wishes of a child.”
The panel quoted the Fifth District’s decision in Hershberger v. Hershberger, 390 So. 3d 747 (Fla. 5th DCA 2024): “Florida law is clear that the delegation of judicial authority to decide time-sharing to any person is error, whether that person is an arbitrator, another parent, a child, or an expert.”
The panel said the order made one child, “not the court, the decision maker over whether any court ordered time-sharing happens with all three minor children at all.” Because the children had to attend together, the eldest child’s veto operated as a refusal for the two younger siblings too. Conditioning the younger children’s time-sharing on the eldest child’s consent was “an abdication of the court’s non delegable duty to determine each child’s time-sharing based on their individual best interests.” The court also cited the Fifth District’s 2025 decision in Kiswani v. Hafza, 403 So. 3d 416, which found error where a trial court left the decision about visits to the child’s therapist.
The court reversed and remanded for the trial court to enter a timesharing schedule based on its own determination of each child’s best interests.
A procedural note
Conway represented himself on appeal, and the opposing party was Nina Lee Wallin. The panel said its jurisdiction came from Florida Rule of Appellate Procedure 9.130(a)(3)(C)(iii)b, which covers orders on temporary parenting plans. A footnote acknowledges that chapters 61, 741 and 742 do not expressly provide for temporary time-sharing schedules, but says the circuit court still has authority to issue a temporary order because these proceedings are in equity (quoting Miller v. Gordon, 365 So. 3d 1247 (Fla. 1st DCA 2023)). The opinion says Conway raised “several arguments” and that the court wrote only on this one.
Who decided it
The decision was per curiam, from Chief Judge Scales and Judges Gordo and Rebull.
The opinion is not final until the time to file a rehearing motion expires and any motion is decided.
Source: Conway v. Wallin, No. 3D26-0386 (Fla. 3d DCA Oct. 21, 2026). This article is general information, not legal advice.
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