Velazquez v. State · No. 1D2025-0550 (Fla. 1st DCA) · Decided October 7, 2026
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Section 948.30(2)(a), Florida Statutes, bars the results of a sex offender probationer’s mandatory polygraph from being used as evidence in court to prove a violation, but it does not bar admissions the probationer makes when a probation officer or treatment provider questions him about those results, the First District Court of Appeal has held. The court affirmed an Alachua County order finding Antonio Velazquez in violation of his sex offender probation.
What Happened
In May 2022, Velazquez pled guilty to attempted sexual battery and received an 18-month prison sentence followed by two years of sex offender probation. His conditions required periodic polygraph examinations and completion of a psychosexual treatment program.
Velazquez took a polygraph in November 2024, and his probation officer, Ann-Marie Brown, received the results about a month later. Concerned by some of his answers, she gave him a legal pad, told him she would ask questions, and directed him to answer in writing. His written answers admitted the first seven violations alleged in the State’s December 2024 violation-of-probation affidavit, including accessing the internet, leaving Alachua County twice without permission, and failing to comply with curfew. His treatment provider, Craig Batchelor, likewise questioned him after reviewing the polygraph results; Batchelor testified that Velazquez admitted violations including smoking marijuana and leaving the county, and confirmed that he had not completed his sex offender treatment program.
Velazquez moved to dismiss the first seven allegations, arguing the admissions flowed from questions derived from his polygraph results. The trial court denied the motion and later admitted the written answers and Batchelor’s testimony over objection, explaining that the results were used only “indirectly” to prompt questioning. It found Velazquez willfully and substantially violated every alleged condition except the two arrearage allegations, extended his probation 18 months from the hearing date, ordered six months of electronic monitoring, and authorized early termination upon successful completion of all terms and conditions.
What the Court Held
Section 948.30(2)(a) requires polygraph results to be provided to the probation officer and treatment provider but directs that they “shall not be used as evidence in court to prove that a violation of community supervision has occurred.” Reviewing the evidentiary ruling for abuse of discretion, and the statutory interpretation de novo, the First District gave two textual reasons the admissions came in.
First, the statute reaches only the “results of the polygraph examination” being “used as evidence.” It “places no evidentiary restriction upon a party’s admissions made separately from the actual polygraph results,” and the State never tried to admit the results themselves. The court likened the case to Hostzclaw v. State, 351 So. 2d 970 (Fla. 1977), in which the Florida Supreme Court held the general rule against polygraph evidence did not necessarily exclude “statements made immediately thereafter and as a direct result” of a polygraph examination.
Second, the prohibition applies only to use of the results as evidence “in court.” It “does not prohibit a probation officer or treatment provider from using the polygraph results in an investigation.” The court reasoned that it “would make little sense” to require that the results be given to those officials if they could not use them in their duties, and that the statute’s stated purpose — “to reduce the sex offender’s denial mechanisms” — “would be meaningless in the absence of further inquiry.” The court concluded that admissions made in response to such investigations “are not made inadmissible by section 948.30(2)(a).”
The court distinguished Griffin v. State, 958 So. 2d 1000 (Fla. 1st DCA 2007), where the lower court erred by admitting the actual polygraph results.
The court added an alternative ground. Even if Velazquez’s broader reading of the statute were correct and excluded his admissions to the first seven violations, affirmance was still warranted because Batchelor testified that Velazquez had not completed his treatment program. Citing Lovett v. State, 338 So. 3d 1132 (Fla. 1st DCA 2022), the court found it “clear from the record” that the trial court would have imposed the same extension had that been the only violation.
Why It Matters
Under this decision, section 948.30(2)(a) keeps the polygraph results themselves out of a violation hearing but does not reach the probationer’s own admissions to follow-up questions by the probation officer or treatment provider. The court also held that, independent of those admissions, the extension rested on the failure to complete treatment, so the result would stand even under the defense’s reading of the statute.
The Opinion
Download the full opinion (PDF)
| Court | First District Court of Appeal |
| Case No. | 1D2025-0550 |
| Lower Court | Circuit Court, Alachua County (Judge William E. Davis) |
| Opinion by | Judge Treadwell (Judges Roberts and Ray concurring) |
| Decided | October 7, 2026 |
| Result | Affirmed |