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An Incapacitated Title Holder Must Stay a Named Foreclosure Defendant, and Rule 1.260 Didn’t Require Substituting His Guardian, Third DCA Rules

Meb Loan Trust VI v. Albert Isaacs, et al. · No. 3D25-1280 (Fla. 3d DCA) · Decided October 7, 2026

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A mortgage holder that sued an incapacitated property owner by name, rather than substituting his court-appointed guardian, should not have had that owner dismissed from its foreclosure suit, the Third District Court of Appeal has held. The court ruled that an incapacitated ward who holds title to the property remains an indispensable defendant, that Florida Rule of Civil Procedure 1.260 “did not apply here at all,” and that the lender’s failure to identify the guardianship in its complaint was “at worst – a misnomer.”

What Happened

MEB Loan Trust VI filed a foreclosure action in May 2023 against Albert Isaacs and other defendants. Isaacs was a co-owner of the property and had executed the mortgage. When MEB sued, it knew a probate court had already adjudicated Isaacs totally incapacitated and appointed Adrian Delancy as guardian of his property.

The letters of plenary guardianship gave Delancy “full power” to, among other things, take possession of and hold the ward’s property for his benefit, but they did not divest Isaacs of title or ownership. The probate court later authorized Delancy “to file pleadings in the foreclosure action . . . to protect the Ward’s interest in real properties and business.”

Delancy answered the complaint in his capacity as guardian of the property, then moved to dismiss Isaacs as a party, arguing that Rule 1.260(a)(1) required MEB to substitute Delancy and that any judgment against Isaacs would be void. MEB responded that Isaacs, as a record title owner, was an indispensable party who could not be substituted. The trial court denied the motion, then granted Delancy’s motion for reconsideration and dismissed Isaacs. MEB appealed the non-final order.

What the Court Held

Reviewing the dismissal de novo, the Third District framed the issue as whether Rule 1.260 required dismissal because MEB did not move to substitute Delancy for Isaacs within ninety days after Delancy filed a statement that Isaacs was incapacitated. “The simple answer is no,” the court wrote.

First, the court held that when an incapacitated person’s right to defend is delegated to a guardian, the ward “remains an indispensable defendant in an action to foreclose their ownership interest,” but is not “substituted” by the guardian. Under Rule 1.210(b), the guardian instead may defend on the ward’s behalf. The guardianship “did not have the legal effect of divesting him of his ownership interest in the property.” The court relied on Community Federal Savings & Loan Association of Palm Beaches v. Wright, 452 So. 2d 638 (Fla. 4th DCA 1984), in which a foreclosure judgment against only the guardian of a minor title holder was held void because the minor was not named.

Second, the court held that Rule 1.260 did not require dismissal and did not apply. The rule, the court said, covers a situation where an existing party to a civil action dies or becomes incompetent. Here, all parties agreed MEB knew of the guardianship before filing, and MEB attempted service on Isaacs at the guardian’s place of business. The court said service on the guardian was legally correct under section 48.042, Florida Statutes.

The court described MEB’s suit against “Albert Isaacs” without any indication of his incapacity as, at worst, a misnomer. It said the better practice would have been to name him as “Albert Isaacs, a ward, by Adrian Delancy, as guardian of the property.” But the rules supply remedies for a misnomer: the guardian could have raised the ward’s incapacity by specific negative averment under Rule 1.120(a), and a misnomer may be corrected by amendment by interlineation, which relates back to the original complaint. The court reversed and remanded.

In a footnote, the court noted that while the appeal was pending, Delancy filed a suggestion of death indicating Isaacs died on June 1, 2026. The court said it expressed “no opinion on the application of Rule 1.260 below, following the death of Isaacs,” while quoting Second District authority favoring disposition on the merits and liberal interpretation of the rule’s ninety-day period.

Why It Matters

For foreclosure plaintiffs and guardians alike, the decision distinguishes two situations: a title holder who was already a ward with a guardian when the suit was filed, and an existing party who dies or becomes incompetent. According to the court, Rule 1.260 addresses the second. In the first, the ward remains a named defendant — the better practice being a caption that reflects the guardianship — and the court pointed to specific negative averment and amendment by interlineation as the remedies for a misnomer.

The Opinion

Download the full opinion (PDF)

CourtThird District Court of Appeal
Case No.3D25-1280
Lower CourtCircuit Court, Miami-Dade County (Judge Reemberto Diaz)
Opinion byJudge Rebull (Chief Judge Scales and Judge Fernandez on the panel; no separate opinions)
DecidedOctober 7, 2026
ResultReversed and remanded