A Florida court may enter a final domestic violence injunction when the petitioner proves she was a past victim of domestic violence, and the statute itself sets no time limit on how old that violence can be. The Sixth District Court of Appeal said so on November 6, 2026, in Buchheit v. Siciliano, No. 6D2025-0337, affirming an injunction that rested on incidents from 2016, 2020 and 2022. The per curiam opinion was joined by Judges Stargel and Kamoutsas; Chief Judge Traver concurred specially with an opinion. The court also certified conflict with the Fifth District.
The petition and the hearing
The wife filed her petition in Lee County in December 2024, during the parties’ divorce, alleging that her husband walked into her condo while she slept, yelled, videotaped and chased her, and had made threats. The trial court did not enter an ex parte temporary injunction at first, then did after a supplemental affidavit. At the final hearing she testified to that visit and to earlier incidents: a 2016 wine glass incident that cut her leg, a 2020 incident in which he choked her and left bruises, a 2022 incident in which he punched her repeatedly, and a January 2023 incident in which he slammed her into a door. The husband denied or explained each. The trial court said “the sworn testimony is disputed” but that “the testimony as to violence between the parties is undisputed,” and entered an injunction through October 1, 2025.
The December incident alone was not enough
The court watched the 62-second video and said it did not match her account: the husband was calm, did not scream or chase, and made no threats. It wrote that if that incident were the only basis, “we would reverse because no competent, substantial evidence supported its entry.”
Domestic violence injunction and past incidents
A final injunction under section 741.30(6)(a), Florida Statutes (2024), requires that the petitioner be either a victim of domestic violence or have reasonable cause to believe she is in imminent danger of becoming one. The court held both showings were supported by the 2016, 2020 and 2022 incidents, each a battery, to which the husband did not object at the hearing. It also pointed to her testimony that his drinking had increased after a plane crash, that drinking had accompanied past violence, and that he appeared unannounced during their divorce. It said the statute “does not contain time limitations” restricting consideration of earlier incidents.
The January 2023 incident
The trial court erred in overruling the husband’s objection to that testimony, because the petition did not mention it and he lacked notice. The panel did not rely on it.
Remoteness and preservation
Second and First District decisions such as Gill v. Gill and Curl v. Roberts say incidents remote in time are insufficient absent current allegations. The husband raised that argument for the first time in his motion for rehearing, which the trial court denied without elaboration. Citing Melrose Ventures, the court held the argument unpreserved and did not consider it. It recertified conflict with the Fifth District, which has concluded otherwise on whether such a rehearing argument is preserved. The court also said the case is not moot though the injunction has expired, because of collateral consequences.
The special concurrence
Chief Judge Traver wrote that even if the argument had been preserved, he would affirm. In his view the remoteness standard from Gill and the rule from Curl conflict with the statute’s plain language, which, he wrote, “does not place time restrictions” on past incidents. He added that trial courts are not required to enter an injunction on an isolated old incident, because the decision is discretionary, and that had the argument been preserved and the court adopted the sister-court precedent, it would have been constrained to reverse.
What this does and does not mean
The holding rests on this record and on preservation. The majority did not decide whether the First and Second District remoteness rule is wrong, because the argument was unpreserved, though it did describe the Second District’s 2010 standard as “untethered to the statute’s plain language” and said that under sister-court precedent the husband would have had a meritorious argument for reversal had he preserved it. The full argument against the rule is in the special concurrence. The court also said the trial court could have disbelieved the wife’s testimony about the earlier incidents because of her refuted account of December, but it did not and the panel would not second-guess it. The opinion is not final until the time for a motion for rehearing expires and any timely motion is resolved.
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Read the opinion (PDF): Download the opinion (PDF)
Source: Buchheit v. Siciliano, No. 6D2025-0337 (Fla. 6th DCA Nov. 6, 2026) (Traver, C.J., concurring specially). This article is general information, not legal advice.