The Sixth District Court of Appeal on October 9, 2026, affirmed a prison releasee reoffender (PRR) sentence for a man convicted of burglary of a conveyance with an assault and a battery. In Reeves v. State, No. 6D2025-1713, Judge Pratt wrote that the PRR statute turns on the offense of conviction, not the offense as charged. Judges Brownlee and Kamoutsas concurred. Judge Pratt also wrote a separate concurrence that goes further and disagrees with seven decisions from other districts. The opinion is not final until the time for rehearing expires.
The charge and the conviction
Reeves was convicted in Polk County of burglary of a conveyance with an assault and a battery. The charge had been burglary of a conveyance with an assault or a battery. The jury instructions and verdict form, the court noted, made clear he was convicted of both.
The argument
Reeves argued the trial court should have asked whether the offense with which he was charged qualified under the PRR statute’s catch-all provision, which covers “[a]ny felony that involves the use or threat of physical force or violence against an individual.” Because the charge allowed for a conviction based on battery alone, and battery does not necessarily involve force or the threat of it, he said the enhancement could not apply.
The holding
The court called that argument foreclosed by State v. Hackley, 95 So. 3d 92 (Fla. 2012). “Under Hackley, it’s not the charged offense that matters for purposes of PRR enhancement; it’s the offense of which the defendant is convicted,” Judge Pratt wrote. Hackley held that a conviction for burglary of a conveyance with an assault falls within the catch-all provision. Reeves was convicted of burglary with an assault and a battery, so at a minimum his conviction for burglary with an assault was enough.
The court tied that result to the statutory text and to what it called “the commonsense notion that sentencing enhancements are based on established convictions rather than unproven charges.” It did not dispute that battery alone is not a forcible felony under State v. Hearns, 961 So. 2d 211 (Fla. 2007). The trial court, it said, did what Hackley requires by looking at the statutory elements of the offense of conviction rather than the evidence in the case.
In a footnote, the court added that any potential Erlinger issue was moot because the jury made findings of fact consistent with Erlinger v. United States, 602 U.S. 821 (2024), before sentencing.
What the court did not decide
The majority opinion does not decide what happens when the conviction itself is only for burglary with an assault or a battery. That is where the separate concurrence goes.
The special concurrence
Judge Pratt wrote that, even if the question were the charge or a conviction for burglary with an assault or battery, Reeves would lose. His reasoning is that the forcible felony statute, section 776.08, lists “burglary” among its enumerated felonies, and the PRR catch-all uses virtually identical language. In his view, burglary therefore comes into the PRR statute through the catch-all.
He acknowledged that this conflicts with Smith v. State, 338 So. 3d 390 (Fla. 3d DCA 2022), Crosley v. State, 247 So. 3d 69 (Fla. 1st DCA 2018), Suffield v. State, 132 So. 3d 333 (Fla. 4th DCA 2014), Santiago v. State, 76 So. 3d 1027 (Fla. 3d DCA 2011), Wilson v. State, 76 So. 3d 332 (Fla. 2d DCA 2011), Williams v. State, 2 So. 3d 984 (Fla. 2d DCA 2008), and Gorham v. State, 988 So. 2d 152 (Fla. 4th DCA 2008). He would have made that reasoning a second holding and certified direct conflict with those seven decisions. He also wrote that he disagrees with two other decisions, Ellis and Tumblin, but would not certify conflict with them because they involved burglary of a dwelling.
The concurrence is Judge Pratt’s own. The majority’s holding rests on Hackley alone.
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