Walker v. State · No. 1D2025-1997 (Fla. 1st DCA) · Decided October 14, 2026
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A defendant who represented himself after a valid Faretta hearing and personally asked for a bench trial validly waived his right to a jury trial, and even if the court’s colloquy had been deficient, the error was invited, the First District Court of Appeal has held. The court affirmed a trespass conviction from Alachua County.
What Happened
Derrick Lamar Walker was convicted in Alachua County Court of trespass on property other than a structure or conveyance, in violation of section 810.09(1)(a)1., Florida Statutes (2024). On appeal he argued that the denial of his motion for judgment of acquittal must be reversed because the State’s evidence was insufficient, and that his oral waiver of his right to a jury trial was invalid.
What the Court Held
The court held that the trial court correctly denied the motion for judgment of acquittal based on the testimony of the property’s operations manager and the Gainesville Police Department officer who notified Walker directly that he could not return to the property. The evidence showed Walker returned to the property twice after the officer, at the operations manager’s request, warned him against entering.
On the jury waiver, the court acknowledged, quoting Torres v. State, 43 So. 3d 831, 833 (Fla. 1st DCA 2010), that the right can be waived in writing or by oral waiver “after a proper colloquy with the trial court,” and that, as the First District held in Sansom v. State, 642 So. 2d 631, 632 (Fla. 1st DCA 1994), “mere failure to object to a bench trial does not constitute a valid waiver of the right to trial by jury, even where the defendant remains silent following counsel’s oral waiver purportedly on behalf of the defendant.” But the record here did not show a mere failure to object. Walker represented himself after a valid Faretta hearing, during which he asked whether he could request a bench trial. The trial court’s colloquy about his waiver of counsel included a discussion of the differences between a jury trial and a bench trial, and at two later pretrial hearings the court asked whether he still wanted a bench trial and Walker confirmed that he did. “Unlike in Sansom v. State,” the court wrote, “this record is not a case of Walker’s silence after defense counsel’s oral waiver of a jury trial on his behalf.” The Faretta colloquy was sufficient to support a knowing, intelligent, and voluntary oral waiver of a jury trial as well.
The court added that “even if the trial court’s colloquy of Walker regarding his waiver of his right to a jury trial had been erroneous, such error was invited.” Walker represented himself at trial but has counsel on appeal, and “Walker’s representation by counsel on appeal does not avoid application of the invited error doctrine to his self-representation at trial.” The trial court had explained, before approving his request to represent himself, that he would be held to the same standard as an attorney. The court also noted the invited-error doctrine applies even to invited fundamental error. It affirmed.
Why It Matters
The decision treats a Faretta colloquy that included a comparison of jury and bench trials, together with the defendant’s own personal request and later confirmations on the record, as enough to support an oral jury waiver, and it applies the invited-error doctrine to a defendant’s own choices while self-represented even though the appeal is handled by counsel. The opinion is not final until any timely motion for rehearing is resolved.
The Opinion
Download the full opinion (PDF)
| Court | First District Court of Appeal |
| Case No. | 1D2025-1997 |
| Lower Court | County Court, Alachua County (Judge Kristine J. Van Vorst) |
| Opinion by | Per curiam (Judges Roberts, Bilbrey, and Nordby concurring) |
| Decided | October 14, 2026 |
| Result | Affirmed |